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I.

INTRODUCTION: AFTER THE END OF HISTORY

Theories of international law and politics are a product of their times.
They focus on the issues of the day (or of the immediate past) and their
assumptions are often the assumptions of the society in which they were born.
Perhaps that it is why so many international relations scholars were surprised
by the end of the Cold War: Their theories were so informed by bipolarity that
they were unable to see the actual changes that would transform the state
system. As international relations scholars are re-assessing their theories in a
post-Cold War world, lawyers may do the same concerning international legal
jurisprudence. Throughout the Cold War, the New Haven School of policyoriented jurisprudence attempted to describe how law was actually used in the
policymaking process and to suggest how it should be used towards the goals
of securing human dignity and the spread of free societies.' But with the
titanic struggle between competing world orders being replaced by parochial
fights and feuds, whither the New Haven School? What insights does it have
for today's world? Does the New Haven School's theory need to catch up to
the practice of international law?
This Article considers the strengths and weaknesses of the New Haven
School in light of the competition among multiple conceptions of "world
public order" that exist today. As a test case, I will look at the competition on
the "grand chessboard" of Eurasia. At one time called the "world island" by
geo-strategists, Eurasia today is home to seventy-five percent of the world's
population, sixty percent of the global GNP, and contains about seventy-five
percent of known energy sources. 2 It is also a geographic space where
multiple conceptions of public order, including those of the United States, the
European Union, Russia, and Islamic fundamentalists, overlap, interact, and at
times compete. This is especially so in the unstable arc of states bordering
Russia: from Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine in the West; down to the
Caucasian countries of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Russian
southwest; and ultimately the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to the Russian south.
In Part II, I will introduce the idea of "diverse systems of public order"
described in policy-oriented jurisprudence. I will also situate the New Haven
School as part of the liberal modernist tradition that attempts to find universal
I.
See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of
Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959) [hereinafter McDougal & Lasswell,
Diverse Systems]; for other examples of key texts of policy-oriented jurisprudence, see also HAROLD D.
LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE

AND POLICY (1992); Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and
World Public Order: A Frameworkfor Policy-OrientedInquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (1969); Harold
D. Lasswell, Yale Law School Professor, Universality in Perspective, Address Before the American
Society of International Law (Apr. 30, 1959), in 53 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1 (1959) [hereinafter
Lasswell, Universality]; Myres S. McDougal, President of the American Society of International Law,
Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity, Address Before the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 30, 1959), in 53 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 107, 107 (1959) [hereinafter
McDougal, Perspectives].
2.

ZBIGNIEW

BRZEZINSKI,

THE GRAND

CHESSBOARD:

AMERICAN

PRIMACY

AND

ITS

GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES 31 (1997). The term "world island" was most notably used by British
geographer Harold Mackinder. Id. at 38. See also JOHN AGNEW, GEOPOLITICS: RE-VISIONING WORLD
POLITICS 28-29 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing Mackinder's world view).
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norms and/or techniques to address questions of political or normative
conflict. Part III will examine the different public orders in today's multipolar,
multinormative world. In Part IV, I will propose the concepts of systemic
borderlands-statesthat are the geopolitical crossroads between two or more
normative realms-and of normativefriction, the process in which competing
conceptions of public order interact in these borderland states, as a means of
describing the normative interactions in a multipolar world. Part V will
consider examples of systemic borderlands and normative friction in Eurasia.
In Part VI, I will propose ways in which the New Haven School can build on
some of its own original insights on the existence of diverse systems of public
order in light of changes in international politics. As this short Article can
only scratch the surface
of so many issues, I will also set out questions for
3
further investigation.
II.

THE NEW HAVEN SCHOOL AND DIVERSE PUBLIC ORDERS

The strengths and weaknesses of the New Haven School derive in part
from its placement as an inheritor of the rationalist project of the European
Enlightenment. Keeping in mind that much of the normative conflict in the
post-Cold War world derives from a debate over Enlightenment ideals and
concepts, seeing the New Haven School's place in this tradition is of
importance.
The New Haven School is a jurisprudence born of the Cold War but
informed by the experiences of World War II and the previous interwar
period. In those years, so soon after World War II, Harold Lasswell and Myres
McDougal "were acutely aware of the dominant position of the United States
in the postwar world ... [and] sought to develop a jurisprudence that could
help U.S. lawyers and policymakers meet their newfound responsibilities,
advancing a just and democratic image. ",4 In part, they sought to define a
jurisprudence which could help policymakers pursue the goal of a just and
democratic society and international system. But, in part they were also trying
to devise a jurisprudence to evade the possible futures of totalitarianism or
destruction.
The result is a pragmatic methodology that shuns formalism in favor of
an attempt to describe how law actually operates in the world.6 As Michael
3.
The issues posed by systemic borderlands and normative friction are foci of my current
research and the subjects of forthcoming articles.
4.
Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and InternationalLaw, 100 AM. J.
INT'L L. 64, 77 (2006).
5.

See MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 474 (2001) (concerning the "shadow of catastrophe") (quoting
Myres McDougal, InternationalLaw, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES
COURS 133, 138 (1953)); Lasswell, Universality, supra note 1,at 6 (concerning the risk of nontotalitarian states being "rolled back"). See also Carl Landauer, Deliberating Speed: Totalitarian
Anxieties and Postwar Legal Thought, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 230-34 (2000) (arguing that in
various essays "it is unquestionable that McDougal and his associates were fighting the Cold War in
print").
6.

LUNG-CHU CHEN,

AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A

POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 14 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining that the New Haven School "is a theory
about international law rather than a theory of international law"); see also Richard A. Falk, Casting the
Spell: The New Haven School of InternationalLaw, 104 YALE L.J.1991, 1991 (1995) (reviewing
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Reisman has written: "From the standpoint of the New Haven School,
jurisprudence is a theory about making social choices. The primary
jurisprudential and intellectual tasks are the prescription and application of
policy in ways that maintain community order and, simultaneously,
achieve
7
the best possible approximation of the community's social goals."
The New Haven School is a mid-twentieth century iteration of the
Enlightenment's belief that the world could be improved through the judicious
application of reason in order to dispel myths and superstitions. 8 It contends
that the appropriate observational standpoint (or how an academic or
policymaker should approach a problem) is to be "as free as possible from
parochial interests and cultural biases .

.

. [and thus able to] clarify for the

active participants in the different communities common interests that these
participants are otherwise unable to perceive." 9 Lasswell and McDougal
argued that all people try to fulfill eight similar values: power, wealth, respect,
well-being, skill, enlightenment, rectitude, and affection.' 0 Ultimately, there is
a shared goal across humanity of pursuing and preserving human dignity. The
New Haven School thus attempts to give scholars and policy-makers the tools
to describe the world as it is and prescribe principles and procedures necessary
to building "a universal order of human dignity.""
Towards this end, the New Haven School seeks first to establish
minimum order-freedom from coercion and the protection of expectations
that derive from international agreements and customary international lawand build from there to optimum order-"the greatest production and widest
distribution of all demanded values that can be attained with available
resources." 12
Although Lasswell and McDougal's goal was a world public order that
recognized human dignity, they found that "[e]ffective, comprehensive
universality, despite the faint shadows of worldwide organization, does not
now exist" and decried "the invocation of spurious universalism."' 3 They
discerned numerous systems of public order, including "Western European
(and North Atlantic), American (North, South), Soviet (European, Asian),
British Commonwealth, Islamic, Hindu, Burmese, [and] Southeastern Asian,"
HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW,

SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992)) (asserting that Lasswell and McDougal break with positivism's formalism
and offer a comprehensive framework of inquiry grounded in factual circumstances).
7.
W. Michael Reisman, Yale Law School Professor, The View from the New Haven School
of International Law, Address Before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 2, 1992), in 86
AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118, 120 (1992); see also Falk, supra note 6, at 1991 (concerning the
interplay of rules and social processes).
8.

See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 39 (2004)

(concerning the Enlightenment); Falk, supra note 6, at 2002 (arguing that the New Haven School is in
the modernist tradition of accessing unconditional truth through social science); see also Kurt Wilk,
InternationalLaw and Global Ideological Conflict: Reflections on the Universality of International
Law, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 648, 661 (1951) (stating that natural law writers assumed universal rationality
leading to a universal law).
9.

CHEN, supra note 6, at 16.

10.
McDougal & Lasswell, Diverse Systems, supra note 1, at 12-13. See also Steinberg &
Zasloff, supra note 4, at 77; CHEN, supra note 6, at 15-16.
11.
McDougal & Lasswell, Diverse Systems, supra note 1, at 11. See also Lasswell,
Universality, supra note 1, at 4.
12.
CHEN, supra note 6, at 86.
13.
McDougal & Lasswell, Diverse Systems, supra note 1, at 3.
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among others.' 4 Thus, rather than international law, they saw international
laws in an anarchy of diverse, contending legal orders.' 5 However, Lasswell
and McDougal also perceived a deep relationship between these diverse
systems, as the major systems of public order were "rhetorically unified...
[because all] systems proclaim the dignity of the human individual and the
in which this ideal is authoritatively pursued
ideal of a worldwide public order
16
and effectively approximated."'
Lasswell and McDougal nonetheless understood that it would be7
difficult to build such a universal order in the face of existing parochialism.'
However, for all of its difficulties, the conflict that Lasswell and McDougal
described was ultimately a conflict between two universalist ideologies.' 8 The
question facing policy-oriented jurisprudence today, though, is what happens
if these diverse public orders reject the Enlightenment project of universalism
altogether and seek instead parochialism, particularity, and the depth of
historical tradition? The assumption of a rhetorical unity across public orders
has gone untested and is controversial. 19 When we speak of world public
order, whose public are we assuming? Which conception of order?
In Part III, I will turn to how the idea of "public order" relates to
multipolar, post-Cold War, international relations.
III.

MULTIPOLARITY AND MULTINORMATIVITY

In this Part, I will first turn to the idea of public order in a state system
defined by regional powers and an over-arching superpower. I will then focus
on the role of law in defining such public orders. Finally, I will describe four
conceptions of public order.
A.

The World and the Region in Defining Public Order

We live in a world of nested public orders: various regional public
orders and (at least) one global public order. Regional public orders can be
thought of in two manners: They occupy a physical, geographic space, but
they are also regions of normative similarity. Our inquiry into regional public
14.
Id.
at 1.
15.
McDougal, Perspectives,supra note 1, at 107 (describing "a variety of 'international' laws
and an anarchy of diverse, contending orders"); Lasswell, Universality,supra note I, at 1-2 (arguing that
international law, as constituted, did not constitute a universal public order but rather that there was an
"anarchy of public orders"); McDougal & Lasswell, Diverse Systems, supra note 1, at 10.
16.
McDougal & Lasswell, Diverse Systems, supra note I, at 5; see also McDougal,
Perspectives,supranote 1,at 132 (concerning "contending, incompatible systems of public order").
17.
McDougal, Perspectives,supra note 1,at 132.
18.
Id. at 108 (describing the struggle between totalitarian orders and non-totalitarian orders
with a democratic core).
19. See Detlev Vagts & Edward McWhinney, Book Review, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 338
(1993) (reviewing HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (1992)) (discussing the high degree of abstraction of
the eight values). See also McDougal, Perspectives, supra note I, at 112 (stating that there is an
increasing unity in values that are sought, as demonstrated by the substance of treaties, the clauses of
constitutions, the platforms of political parties, and other such normative declarations); Myres S.
McDougal, The Comparative Study ofLaw for Policy Purposes: Value Clarificationas an Instrument of
Democratic World Order, 61 YALE L.J. 915, 915 (1952) [hereinafter McDougal, Comparative Study]
(stating that people increasingly want common values and cooperation).
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orders can thus be assisted with a turn towards ideational political geography.
As political geographer Harm de Blij has observed: "The world map of
international boundaries reveals legality and conceals reality. Everyone who
travels internationally20knows that some borders are crossed with ease, others
with great difficulty."
De Blij argues that if one maps these "easy" and "difficult" boundaries,
"[t]he world seems to be divided into about a dozen realms within which
boundaries are usually, though not always, reasonably 'easy,' but between
which they tend to be tough to cross, surface or otherwise. 2 1 De Blij's realms

are North America, Middle America (Mexico and Central America), South
America, Europe, North Africa/Southwest Asia, Subsaharan Africa, Russia,
South Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, the Austral realm (Australia/New
Zealand), and the Pacific realm (the Pacific islands).22 Each is a geographic
space, but each is also a normative realm.
Each of these realms can also be thought of as being related to at least
one great power, or hegemon, that plays a crucial role in defining the "rules of
the game" for state relations within that realm.23 Or, for certain realms, there
is active competition for hegemonic status (see Table 1).
Table 1: Realms and Hegemons
Realm

Regional Hegemon or Competing Powers

North America
Middle America
South America
Europe

United States
United States
United States; Venezuela; Brazil
European Union (economic, domestic
affairs); United States (security)
Saudi Arabia; Iran; (Russia and China
towards Central Asian republics)
South Africa; France; China
Russia
India; Pakistan
China
China
Australia
United States; China

North Africa/Southwest Asia
Subsaharan Africa
Russia
South Asia
East Asia
Southeast Asia
The Austral realm
Pacific realm

20.

HARM DE BLIJ, WHY GEOGRAPHY MATTERS: THREE CHALLENGES FACING AMERICA:

CLIMATE CHANGE, THE RISE OF CHINA, AND GLOBAL TERRORISM 120 (2005).

21.
22.

Id. at 121.
Id. at 122-23. A similar mapping of civilizations was made by Samuel Huntington. See

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 26-27,

45-48 (1996). Using either de Blij's list or Huntington's mapping, it is important to note that while one
or more states may contend for primacy in each realm or civilization, each of these is not necessarily
defined primarily by the state(s) claiming leadership, but rather by the norms of each realm or
civilization. As such, although much of the discussion will relate to the interaction of states within or
across realms, the core of this analysis is not so much state-centric as norm-centric.
23.
For some, the term hegemon has a negative ideological connotation. I do not use it with
any such negative implication; rather, I use the terms hegemon and hegemony merely to recognize
relative power and leadership.
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Although the United States is listed as a regional hegemon or competing
power in four of these realms, one must keep in mind that this is only in terms
of the regional public orders. As will be discussed momentarily, the United
States is the only state that can make a claim to being a global hegemon.
Be they regional or global, hegemons have certain similarities. At their
most brusque, hegemons use "material incentives," essentially carrots and
sticks, to alter the political and economic incentives of other states. 24
However, hegemony is not only about physical power, it is about the control
of ideas, of norms. It is not just about domination but, to use Max Weber's
term, it is about legitimate domination in which "every such system attempts
to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy.' 25 Hegemonic states
are supported by "universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which lay
down general rules of behavior for states
and for those forces of civil society
26
that act across national boundaries."
Consequently, each actual or potential hegemon has a particular
conception of norms that it enforces, and hopefully socializes others into
viewing as legitimate, within its sphere of influence. These norms could relate
to the particular issues of importance within the region-self-determination,
the relation of great to lesser powers, norms of intervention, the protection of
ethnic minorities, the relation of states to markets, etc.
Besides expanding on this concept of normative regionalism, we must
also consider the special role of the United States, not only as a regional
hegemon but as a globe-spanning superpower. In this sense, international
relations theorist Peter Katzenstein has described the current system as "a
world of regions, embedded deeply in an American imperium." 27 This
imperium is not a nineteenth century styled territorial empire, but (to use the
description of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri) a new form of rule based on
the expansion of markets and neoliberal institutions. 28 As Katzenstein
concludes, "[t]erritorial 29
'empire' and nonterritorial 'Empire' are analytical
opposites or ideal types."
Before turning to different conceptions of public order, I will first briefly
introduce the relationship of law to public order.
B.

The Role of Law in Defining a Public Order

In international affairs, law follows power. The structure of the state
system affects the normative content of international law. When German
historian Wilhelm Grewe analyzed the role of the United States in the Western
hemisphere, the role of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in
Asia, as well as the roles of the European hegemonies of Spain, France, and
24.
G. John lkenberry & Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, 44 INT'L
ORG. 283, 285 (1990).
25.
MAX WEBER, I ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 213 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978);
see also Ikenberry & Kupchan, supra note 24, at 289.
26.
Ikenberry & Kupchan, supra note 24, at 288 (quoting ROBERT W. COX, PRODUCTION,
POWER, AND WORLD ORDER 172 (1987)).
27.
PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, A WORLD OF REGIONS: ASIA AND EUROPE IN THE AMERICAN
IMPERIUM 1 (2005).
28.
MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000).
29.
KATZENSTEIN, supra note 27, at 4.
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Britain, he found that (as paraphrased by Detlev Vagts), "[t]he hegemon in
30
each case led the way in formulating the international law rules of the time."
The transformation of the international system from a bipolar competition into
one of multipolar competition with an overlay of a single superpower is
reflected in the evolution of international law. The specifics of these changes
will be considered in the next Section. First, though, we will consider the
relationship of law to hegemonic political power.
In some instances, "powerful states tend to use international law as a
means of regulation as well as of pacification and stabilization of their
dominance"; in others, "faced with the hurdles of equality and stability that
international law erects, they withdraw from it.' 31 Dominant states do not
usually maintain static approaches to international law, but rather "oscillate"
between instrumentalization and withdrawal.3
Attempts to use international law as a method of direct rule is
problematic because, in the decentralized international state system, the "lawmakers and subjects of international law are usually identical., 33 Rather,
international law serves the hegemon in three ways. First, it provides a mantle
of respectability to the naked exercise of Rower. Once dominance is regarded
as legitimate, it becomes authority.
Second, the indeterminacy of
international law is used to provide leeway for hegemonic action. Finally,
international legal rules that favor the strengths and weaknesses of a particular
hegemonic state may protect that35 state, or at least soften the landing, when
that state is no longer a hegemon.
However, besides being a tool for the hegemon, one must keep in mind
that an international legal order remains stable only to the extent that it
provides benefits to the small and medium powers as well. Once a hegemon
subverts a system by being less willing to play by similar (if not the same)
rules and more interested in "exploit[ing] its hegemonic status for its own
36
narrowly defined purposes," it can be thought of as a "predatory hegemon."
History has shown the United States that this is an inherently unstable
situation due to the ability of second and third tier powers to join together in
reaction. Consequently, prudent management of a regional or world public
order requires the leader to keep in mind what benefits second and third tier
states hope to gain from being within a particular international public order.
C.

Four Conceptions of Public Order

With this as a backdrop, I will turn now to four conceptions of public
order. I will note a few issues that imply the major characteristics of each
30.
Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 843, 844 (2001); see
WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers trans., 2000).
31.
Nico Krisch, InternationalLaw in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping
of the InternationalLegal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 371 (2005).

32.
33.

Id. at 379.
Id. at 378.

34.
Id. at 374.
35.
Concerning the decline of hegemony and its relationship to regime theory, see generally
ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 182-216 (1984).
36.
ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 345 (1987).
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system and give benchmarks for comparison to other conceptions of public
order.
1.

The U.N./WTO System

When commentators refer to the international legal system as a global,
unified system, they are often focusing on the law and process emanating
from the United Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Together,
these two institutions cover the most pressing topics of international security,
human rights, trade, and commerce. It is the system of public order taught in
most general international law courses in most law schools. While there has
been a concern recently that there may be a fragmentation of international law
among these various substantive systems (the law of human rights, the law of
trade, etc.), there are active attempts at preventing3 7 such a fracturing of what is
generally seen as a more-or-less cohesive whole.
The first main characteristic of the international system is
multilateralism and robust global international organization. The period
immediately following World War II was one of international institution
building like few other times in history. Not only the United Nations, but the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organization of American States, the
European Community, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
were established, to name a few. Today the United Nations and the WTO, the
successor to the GATT, act as the pre-eminent global rule-making institutions.
The second main characteristic is the regulation of the use of force: the
use of managerial techniques based on Security Council authorization, rather
than just war theory and the like, to prevent conflict. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht
said that the world's legal system was grounded in an absolute rule: "'There
shall be no violence' by states." 38 He called this the "'primordial duty of the
law.' 39 The U.N. system prohibits the use of force between states in Article
2(4). It envisions the Security Council managing the use of international
violence and, through a determination that there is a threat to international
peace and security, authorizing the use of force in certain instances. 40 The
Charter also allows for individual and collective self-defense when the United
Nations is unable to act.4 1

37.
See International Law Commission, Study Group, Fragmentationof International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006); see also JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003);

Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271
RECUEIL DES COURS 101 (1998). Elsewhere, I have argued that methods of resolving treaty conflicts are
inadequate for the substantive conflicts at hand and that there is a deeper systemic incoherence than is
generally recognized. See Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.

REv. 573 (2005).
38.
THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND
ARMED ATTACKS 1 (2002) (quoting HERSH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 64 (1933)).
39.
Id. (quoting LAUTERPACHT, supra note 38, at 64).
40.
U.N. Charter art. 42.
41.
Id.arts. 51, 52.
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Third, besides the construction of global international organization,
international law was also "individualized" both through increasing attention
to human rights and also through the use of international criminal law to
punish individuals for their actions, as in the cases of the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals after World War II, the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals,
and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The 1990s were also a time of unprecedented growth of international
tribunals. Criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ICC, the
institutionalization of trade dispute settlement in the WTO, and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea were all new. 42 There were more
'ourts covering more topics with more cases than ever before. Dispute
resolution in the international system is thus becoming more legalistic
43 and
technical, using third-party dispute resolution to an ever greater extent.
The U.N. system thus attempts to build a consensual world public order
in which the use of force is cabined by a Security Council-led managerial
system, political differences are addressed in open fora, and erstwhile
diplomatic matters gradually formalized via codification, regulation, and
legalistic dispute settlement.
2.

The United States Imperium

In contrast to the U.N. system is the world public order as it is being
redefined by the United States. If the U.N. system is about restraining state
power, the U.S. system is about according leeway of action to the United
States as hegemon.
Robert Kagan described U.S. exceptionalism in his article, Power and
Weakness. First, he described Europe as having no traditional security threats
and encompassing a sort of "post-modern paradise." 44 It is inward-looking and
satisfied that it has found a set of rules that foster peace and prosperity, at least
within Europe. However, there are, by contrast, the tough places in the
world-swaths of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia-that are definitely
outside of this post-modern paradise; they are still mired in the modern and
the pre-modern world of Hobbes. The United States is the exception; it has to
navigate between these worlds, maintaining security for the post-modern
world by remaining engaged with the modern and the pre-modern.
Consequently, the United States has not incorporated the relatively rigid
legalism of those who live their lives within the post-modern paradise because
it needs flexibility to address the problems emanating from the rest of the
world. Across administrations-Republican or Democrat-there are certain
similarities in the U.S. style of foreign policy and public order because
regardless of the party in power, the United States is attempting to maintain
stability in the fractious regions of the world. The United States has a world
view that emphasizes flexibility over legalism. Following Peter Katzenstein, I
42.
Concerning the proliferation of tribunals, see YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING
JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 1-11 (2003).
43.
See generally Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create
InternationalTribunals:A Response to ProfessorsPosnerand Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REv. 899 (2005).
44.
Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, POL'Y REv., June-July 2002, at 3, 25 (internal

quotation omitted).

2007]

Whose Public, Whose Order?

will refer to this as American "imperium," not because it is classically
imperial in the sense of territorial conquest and management, but rather to
reflect the systemic description that there is no other level of leadership higher
than the imperial.
The United States's conception of world public order is hierarchicalhegemony has its privileges. Many often forget that in the nineteenth century,
besides declaring in the Monroe Doctrine the exclusion of outside powers
from the Western hemisphere, the United States also assumed a right to
unilateral military intervention. 45 So while U.S. power during much of the
Cold War at least nodded towards multilateralism, the current President picks
up threads from America's imperial maneuvers of a century ago. By this view,
the United Nations does not so much set rules for all states as it is a
mechanism to (a) legitimize the application of hegemonic power and (b)
coordinate burden-sharing to prevent excessive strain on the hegemon's
resources, known as "imperial overstretch.""
For example, the United States has attempted to rework international law
to include new rights of intervention by means of the "hegemonic capture" of
the U.N. Security Council. 47 Jose Alvarez points to the Security Council
revamping the rules of the use of force with three new general norms: (a) the
reconfiguration of certain types of terrorist violence as an "armed attack for
purposes of U.N. Charter" Article 51 rights of self-defense; (b) the harboring
of terrorists as justification for the use of military force against a state; and (c)
although an ongoing terrorist threat may be unpredictable, the use of force
against a state harboring terrorists does not necessarily "become
impermissible retaliation or illegal anticipatory self-defense, or exceed the
rules of proportionality." 48 These new rules are "exceptionally
indeterminate"A and the use of the Security Council's Chapter VII powers
essentially legislates for the international system as its mandatory nature
circumvents the web of existing multilateral treaties (as well as the need to
formulate new treaties to make a legally binding rule).5
The U.S. maneuvering concerning the rules for the use of force also
exemplifies a growing skepticism concerning the role of international
institutions. Although the United States was the primary architect of the
United Nations and of other international organizations, it is now seen as
somewhat hostile to the institutions and the United Nations in particular. 5 1 To
45.

Vagts, supra note 30, at 846. For example, after the 1965 intervention by the United States

in the Dominican Republic, Leonard Meeker, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State "asserted a
general right to use military force by the United States in the Western hemisphere against 'foreign
ideologies."' KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 5, at 413.
46.

PAUL KENNEDY, RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 515 (1987).

47.
Concerning the "new rights," see Krisch, supra note 31, at 395. Concerning "hegemonic
capture," see Jose Alvarez, Hegemonic InternationalLaw Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873, 873-74

(2003).
48.
49.
50.
51.

Alvarez, supra note 47, at879.
Id. at881.
See id. at874-75.
Consider the politicking around the payment of U.S. dues to the United Nations. See

generally JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
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(2004) (noting the refusal to pay U.N. dues as an example of the United States undermining a treaty to
which itisa member); Suzanne Nossel, Retail Diplomacy: The Edifying Story of UN Dues Reform,
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the extent that the United States does use international institutions, it is to
leverage its own power (and prevent imperial overstretch) or to reinforce its
hierarchical position. United States practice at the United Nations has focused
on using disproportionate power available via the Security Council. In
international finance, the United States has focused its energies on the World
Bank and the IMF, two institutions in which the United States has significant
control due (in the case of the IMF) to voting rights being based on levels of
funding. The United States does not give such levels of support to UNCTAD,
which has a flatter decision-making structure. 52 Similarly, in international
criminal law, the United States pressed for the International Criminal
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, which were used in resolving
regional conflicts, but the United States has had little enthusiasm for the
ICC,
53
which could bring the United States itself into its jurisdictional sweep.
Although the United States had in previous decades been a proponent of
the use of third-party dispute resolution, as its power has grown, its
enthusiasm for using such tribunals has generally decreased.54 The key turning
point was the International Court of Justice's 1986 decision in Nicaragua v.
United States.5 5 Now the United States either attaches reservations to treaties
with dispute resolution mechanisms or does not sign additional protocols that
allow for such dispute resolution.
Seeking to maximize the flexibility of informal understandings and also
to decrease the extent of domestic effects of international law, the United
States has either rejected many recent multilateral treaties or let them lie
moribund in the Senate. 56 In other instances, the United States has started to
reinterpret treaty language-ranging from the prohibitions of the ABM Treaty
to the meaning of the Geneva and Torture Conventions-in a manner to
increase the United States's room to maneuver. Rather than treaties and
formal third-party dispute resolution, the United
States tends to favor informal
57
processes that allow for greater flexibility.
The legal order of U.S. imperium thus favors flexibility over formalism
and practicality over coherence. Rules are primarily to keep the system stable,
not to rein in the hegemon. In this view, systemic stability requires a hegemon
with greater freedom of movement.

NAT'L INT., Winter
2001-02,
at 94, available at http://www.democracyarsenal.org/
RetailDiplomacyTNI.pdf (giving an insider's account of the dues renegotiations).
52.
See, e.g., Krisch, supra note 31, at 398.
53.
Id.
54. Id. at 391. Exceptions remain, such as WTO and NAFTA anti-dumping and investment
disputes.

55.
See, e.g., JOHN F. MURPHY, supra note 51, at 351 (arguing that the U.S. reaction to the
Nicaragua case exemplifies how the United States dislikes constraints on its security prerogatives); see
also Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26).
56. David Kaye, K. Russell Lamotte & Peter Hoey, Pacts Americana, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2006, at A41.
57.
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The EU Regional Order

The legalism of the European conception of public order stands in
contrast to the norms of the United States's world order. One can say that the
history of Europe since World War II is largely a story of increasing reliance
on, and comfort with, regional and other international institutions. The rise of
European economic power and the securing of the European peace can be
crafted as the story of the evolution from the European Coal and Steel
Community to the European Union. Regardless as to whether such a narrative
would tell the whole story (it does not), it nonetheless is a narrative that
engenders a respect for international institutions. As Martti Koskenniemi put
it, "[w]e Europeans share this intuition: the international world will be how
we are. And we read international law in the image of our domestic legalism:
multilateral treaties as legislation, international courts as an independent
judiciary, the Security Council as the police." 58 The result is that nations of
Europe have in the European Union the deepest pooling of sovereignty of any
international organization, and the European Union is thus somewhere
between being a regional arrangement among countries and a proto-state.
The wave of institution-building after World War II was defined by the
United States-through the construction of the United Nations, the GATT, the
IMF, and the World Bank. However, as the Cold War ended, besides
supporting the creation of the WTO and the regional international criminal
courts, the United States stuttered in its support for international institutions.
European nations became the primary institution-builders, supporting not only
these institutions (and in particular being a prime mover for the creation of the
WTO) but also the ICC and the 59Kyoto Protocol, two of the defining
institutions of the post Cold War era.
However, the European Union, as regional hegemon, has its difficulties.
A rising economic superpower, it nonetheless seems confused and reticent in
the realm of foreign and military policy. In part, the problem is that the
European Union is not a single state; it still is (as of this writing) twenty-seven
sovereign states that rarely agree completely on diplomatic and military issues
(as will be discussed below regarding the Iraq War) and yet with decisionmaking structures that operate on a consensus basis. But the institutional
challenges of the European Union are not the focus of this Article; rather our
concern is with how the European Union (and other European institutions),
shortcomings and all, define the normative space of Europe.
By way of example, consider how the European Union has managed
successor state issues in Yugoslavia and the former-USSR since the 1990s.
The general international law of recognition of new states is declaratory, that
is, once a state meets the basic requirements for statehood under customary

58.
Martti Koskenniemi, InternationalLaw in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 113, 117 (2005). He also asked: "I often wonder to what extent international law is
becoming a political theology in Europe ....
" Id. at 120. By contrast, Koskenniemi situates the U.S.
view as being one of rational choice: "Legalization, is just a policy choice, a matter of costs and
benefits-with no a priorireason to believe that the latter would outweigh the former." Id. at 117.
59.

See MARK LEONARD, WHY EUROPE WILL RUN THE 21 ST CENTURY (2005).

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:331

international law, there is an assumption (though
not an absolute requirement)
60
that it would be recognized by other states.
While the European Union has not denied the declaratory nature of
recognition, it established preconditions to recognition that exemplify the
normative concerns of the region in the Declaration on the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union 61 and
the Declaration on Yugoslavia. 62 For example, the Declaration on the
Recognition of New States required states seeking recognition to respect and
support conceptions of rights set out in the Helsinki Final Act and various
treaties, guarantee minority rights, and commit to a democratic form of
government. 63 None of these factors are requirements for recognition under
international law, but the European Union is using its economic power to
change the effective 64norms in its region, encompassing non-member states as
well as its members.
The EU order is thus based on using international institutions to extend a
zone of peace and prosperity. While implying that the United States is more
adept at bullying than persuading, the European Union itself holds out the
promise of recognition (and the threat of non-recognition), a special
relationship, and/or accession as a means to persuade/entice/force its
neighbors to reorganize their domestic polities and international politics.
4.

The Russian Regional Order

While the legalistic style of European public order can be traced to the
reliance of European states upon institutions to prevent a return to the era of
great wars in Europe, one can similarly connect the Russian style of regional
leadership to its history of invasion and insularity. The end of the USSR
stripped Russia of layers of buffer states. The loss of the Caucasus and Central
Asia also renewed old fears of Turkish and Islamic power. 65 This was
compounded by the European Union and NATO expanding their
organizations into Eastern Europe. In the ashes of the USSR, and amidst the
chaos of economic reforms, the sense of security of the average Russian
plummeted.
The response of the Russian leadership was to attempt to regain
influence and status and define itself as the protector of its weaker neighbors
against Western and Islamic encroachment. This was an agenda that found
support from Communists, Nationalists, and "Westernizing" Liberals. For
60. Jochen A. Frowein, Non-Recognition, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L., at 627 (R.
Bernhardt ed., 1992). Recognition itself is not a formal requirement of statehood. Rather, recognition
merely accepts a factual occurrence. Thus, recognition is "declaratory" as opposed to "constitutive."
Nonetheless, no state is required to recognize an entity claiming statehood.
61.
European Political Cooperation Press Release 129/91, Declaration on the "Guidelines on
the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union," 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1486 (1992)
[hereinafter Recognition Declaration].
62.
European Political Cooperation Press Release 129/91, Declaration on Yugoslavia, 31
I.L.M. 1485 (1992).
63.
Recognition Declaration, supra note 61, at 1486, 1487.
64.
For example, concerning the use of the promise of accession as a carrot encouraging the
adoption of domestic legislative changes in Turkey, see LEONARD, supra note 59, at xi.
65.
BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2, at 88-89.
66.
JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, COLD PEACE: RusstA's NEW IMPERIALISM 11 (2004).
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example, one "relatively moderate" 1992 report by Russian officials and
policy experts would have Russia play the role of "regulating the situation in
Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Far East." 67 In 1993, Boris Yeltsin, who
was generally viewed as being open to reforms and cooperation with the
United States and the European Union, oriented Russian foreign policy
towards "converg[ing]" much of the former Soviet Union into "a single
political, military, and economic 'space."' 68 Yevgeny Primakov, former
Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Russia (in 1998 and 1999), described
this as a struggle between "Atlanticists" (led by the United States) and
"Eurasianists" (led by Russia) for supremacy in Eastern Europe. 69 The Near
Abroad policy was becoming less and less about good relations with other
sovereign states as it was about the perceived security needs of70Russia and an
attempt to reconstitute something like the former Soviet Union.
Beyond protection of the Russian heartland, Russia's public order is also
linked to the protection of the interests of the twenty million ethnic Russians
71
living in other states throughout the region, usually as an ethnic minority.
This, in turn, affects how Russia addresses such issues as self-determination,
sovereignty, and the norm of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of
another state. For example, Russian "[o]fficials argued that Russians could not
maintain their identity outside a Russian state; hence the re-creation of a larger
unit to incorporate these territories was vital for the survival of the Russian
people." 72 This often meant setting aside the standard international legal rule
that favored the domestic protection of minority rights over allowing
secession and instead becoming an advocate for a robust re-interpretation of
the rights of ethnic minorities and the espousal of claims of external selfdetermination and sovereignty by Russians in Georgia and Moldova, to name
two prominent examples. The normative implications of this Near Abroad
policy emphasize Russia's security prerogatives. In some ways that are similar
to the U.S. style of public order, it revives an older conception of international
law that makes a sharp distinction between great powers and weak states.
Soviet and Russian legal scholarship needs to be understood as
providing the legal basis for Russian/Soviet foreign policy. 73 In the early days
of the Soviet Union there was a tension in trying to apply Marxism to
international law, which proved to be theoretically difficult. 74 Soviet
67.
BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2, at 106-07 (quoting Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, A
Strategy for Russia (1992)).
68.
BUGAJSKI, supra note 66, at 8.
69.
Id. at 10. Charles Clover, Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of
Geopolitics, 78 FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 9-10 (describing Eurasianism as "an umbrella
philosophy, absorbing all that is radical in the bubbling cauldron of post-Soviet political thought"); see
also Sergei Kortunov, Is the Cold War Over?, 44 INT'L AFF. (Moscow) 141, 151-152 (1998), quoted in
TARJA LANGOSTROM, TRANSFORMATION IN RuSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (2003) (concerning
Russia surviving various "onslaughts" only to bow to America in the post-Cold War).
70. See statements by Andrei Kozyrev and description of 1995 Kremlin policy statement
which would have given Moscow control of external borders of the Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS), discussedin BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2, at 107-09.
71.
BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2, at 89.
72. BUGAJSKI, supra note 66, at 8.
73. See LANGOSTROM, supra note 69, at 169 (explaining that legal scholars are concerned
mostly with supporting, rather than criticizing, government actions).
74. See id. at 165-66.
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international lawyers emphasized the particularity of the USSR, arguing that
the version of international law that the USSR viewed as binding 75was not the
same as the version of international law postulated by other states.
In the post-Stalin years, when the inevitability of war with capitalist
states was no longer an ideological given, Soviet international law scholars
could then assume there was a single international legal system. 76 Their
arguments often turned on showing how the West violated the norms of that
system. In the era of perestroika, the state-centric view began to be set aside
for a new cosmopolitan humanism. 77 Scholars began focusing on human
rights and decrying the state-centric view that prevented the Soviet Union
from seeing the individual as a subject of international law. 78 The Westernoriented policies that were adopted soon after the end of the USSR were then
overtaken by a new 79assertiveness of Russian prerogatives and Russian
conceptions of legality.
Perhaps this new assertiveness was best exemplified by Russian attitudes
towards the use of force. Russian troops became involved in conflicts in
Georgia and Moldova. 80 Together, this showed that while Russia jealously
guarded its own sovereign prerogatives, it also exercised a policy as if the
states in its Near Abroad had "only a diminished sovereignty."
This focus on maintaining control over the states on its borders informed
other aspects of Russia's approach to international law, such as its use of
treaties. Soviet international law had been positivist, focusing on the explicit
consent of agreements rather than on customary international law as a source
of law. 82 In the post-Soviet era, Russia shrewdly used treaties and the
ratification process for political leverage. Bugajski contends that:
Treaties and other interstate agreements are manipulated to exert pressure on specific
governments. Even when bilateral treaties were signed with several neighbors, their
ratification by parliament was delayed or indefinitely postponed without presidential
opposition. The resistance displayed by the Russian legislature at vital times was
a
8 3
smokescreen for government noncompliance with an existing international agreement.

Moreover, since the mid-1990s, caught between fears of domestic chaos
and international encirclement by foreign powers, the Russian leadership and
public have turned from Western conceptions of human rights. For his part,
75.
Wilk, supra note 8, at 650.
76.
LANGOSTROM, supra note 69, at 167.
77.
Id. at 108.
78.
See, e.g., id. at 115-16.
79.
Id. at 120. Many Kremlin watchers believe that the recent spike in oil prices has
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Democracy and the Former Soviet Union, HARV. INT'L REv., Spring 2006, at 40, 45.
80.
The legal issues surrounding Russia's foreign policy towards Moldova are discussed at
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Vladimir Putin has spoken about the rule of law on the one hand but also
"asserted his belief in a strong state as a 'traditional Russian value' while
rejecting the 'Anglo-Saxon model of liberal governance' because it was 'illsuited for Russia."' 84 Perhaps more alarming was that when Putin appointed a
special representative to address the human rights situation in Chechnya, the
representative began by saying that Russia and the West would first have to
agree on a definition of human rights, 85 calling into question over fifty years
ofjurisprudence and state practice.
In conclusion, international law in Russia is defined by deep cultural
traits and persistent concerns. Tarja Ldng6strom thus wrote:
[T]he history of international law in Russia appears as a narrative concerning Russia's
entry into the European states-system in the beginning of the 18' h century and the ensuing
intellectual challenge about Russian identity. Thus, Russian international law writings
contribute to this ongoing debate, in these writings--or in the discourse that they
provoke-a
86 central question is Russia's position in the world, in particular, its relation to
the West.

D.

Conclusions

While these conceptions of public order are not inapposite, they are
organized around different concerns and issues. The U.N. system seeks to
restrain the use of force by states and, to a certain extent, increase equity
among member states. The United States's conception of public order is based
on its view that it is in an exceptional position-both in terms of power and
responsibility-and that it must be accorded the flexibility to act. The EU
system is one that grew out of Europe's peculiar post-war history of deep
institutionalization as a means to restore order and foster prosperity. And the
Russian system reflects Russia's overarching concerns over security, defense
of its borders, and the desire for international prestige. Each of these public
orders has a different conception not only of what is "right" but even of what
is a desirable society.
Public orders are not static. Their growth and atrophy is played out in
and among sovereign states. How public orders expand and contract and what
happens where two or more public orders overlap are the issues for Part IV.
IV.

A.

SYSTEMIC BORDERLANDS AND NORMATIVE FRICTION

Normative Colonization and Systemic Borderlands

Norms matter. Socializing other states to norms that are beneficial to a
hegemon can increase legitimacy, decrease the costs of power projection, and
leverage power through the availability of allies. If a hegemon can cause the
spread of its norms, it may be able to avoid the deployment of its armies. But
how do norms actually spread from one country to another?
Robert Axelrod described the process in game theoretic terms. He called
the description "territoriality." Territory, in Axelrod's usage, may be physical
84.
85.
86.

BUGAJSKI, supra note 66, at 20.
LANGOSTROM, supra note 69, at 126.
Id. at 8-9.
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space, but it can also be a group of characteristics or norms.8 7 If we use
territoriality in the physical, geographic sense, then the proximity of two states
plays an important role in defining each state's norms due to their frequency
of interaction. At times, one actor will copy the strategy of his neighbor.'
Thus, "colonization" occurs when the strategies--or in this case the normsof one territory spread to another territory. Axelrod's idea is that "neighbors
90
interact and the most successful strategy spreads to bordering locations.'
Yet while Axelrod's game theoretic territoriality explains certain aspects
of why geography matters in normative diffusion, it essentially sets aside the
question of how a particular norm is socialized (the assumption being it was
rational to set aside one strategy and adopt another, more successful strategy).
Here we see the limits of game theory in describing normative diffusion:
While norms may be considered as akin to strategies, they actually represent
much more, and the abandonment of one set of norms and the adoption of
another cannot be explained away by utility maximization. Rather, we need to
consider how and why people change their beliefs and states change their
norms.
Ikenberry and Kupchan describe three mechanisms of normative
socialization. Normativepersuasion is where compliance occurs without using
material sanctions or inducements. It is "beliefs before acts," such that
"normative persuasion -- norm change -- policy change (cooperation through
legitimate domination)." 91
External inducement, by contrast, uses various political, military, and
social incentives or sanctions to cause a change in policy. It is "acts before
beliefs," which they map in a causal chain: "external inducement --> policy
change (cooperation through coercion) -- norm change (cooperation through
legitimate domination). 92
Finally, internal reconstruction is direct intervention into another state
and the transformation of one or more domestic institutions. Although
Ikenberry and Kupchan in 1990 suggested that "[s]uch extensive intervention
93
can occur only in the aftermath of war or as a result of 'formal' empire,"
they had not yet witnessed the massive political reconstruction of Eastern
Europe and certain South American and East Asian states by the World Bank,
IMF, and other lenders in the 1990s (giving credence to Hardt and Negri's
new formulation of "empire").94
Perhaps the two greatest examples of normative diffusion and empire (in
terms of lasting effect) are how European colonialism assisted the spread of
European concepts of statehood 95 and the successive caliphates and the spread
87.
For example, a legal system may have certain norms concerning expropriation; its
"neighbors" (in the normative sense of territoriality) are those systems that have similar, though not
identical, norms on expropriation. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 158-59 (1984).
88.
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of Islam from the seventh to the fifteenth centuries. As norms spread there are
boundaries between one normative realm, or system, and another. At times a
state can be on one side or another of a normative border: West Germany was
in the Atlantic Alliance, East Germany was in the Warsaw Pact. If normative
boundaries coincide with national boundaries the situation is thus somewhat
simplified. But, particularly in today's Eurasia, there are many states that are
themselves the boundaries between two normative systems and they
themselves have aspects of both. 96 1 call these countries or regions systemic
borderlands. In these cases we are concerned with what happens when the
edges of normative regions overlap.
B.

Defining Normative Friction

Physical proximity and history can cause normative friction and/or norm
adoption within a country. Adoption is easier to notice: This is when a country
adopts a new normative framework that places it solidly within a particular
public order. But some states are unable to completely move from one public
order to another. Such cases can lead to normativefriction.
Normative friction in Eurasia is caused by one of two mechanisms: (a)
the pulling on systemic borderland states by different hegemons, each of
which wants that state firmly within its normative realm; or (b) the pulling on
a borderland state by one hegemon and the resistance to that pull by the state
itself, even though it is not contested by another hegemon.
Normative friction can relate to domestic laws, such as whether a
particular conception of property rights or of human rights will be adopted. It
can also concern international legal norms, such as to which treaties a state
will become a signatory, which international organizations a state may join,
the recognition of national borders, and issues of non-intervention.
Along the arc of instability that was once the Silk Road and is now the
Russian Near Abroad are a series of systemic borderlands facing such
normative friction.
V.

SILK ROADS, GREAT GAMES, AND NORMATIVE FRICTION IN EURASIA

I will focus on two types of normative friction in Eurasia: (a) friction
between regional, partially overlapping, public orders; and (b) friction
between regional orders and world orders. 97 I will use two examples to
illustrate these conflicts: the competition over Eastern Europe and the various
conflicts concerning states in the Black Sea/Caspian Sea region.

96.
Regarding borderlands as opposed to boundaries, see Julian V. Minghi, European
Borderlands: International Harmony, Landscape Change and New Conflict, in 3 EURASIA: WORLD
BOUNDARIES 89 (Carl Grundy-Warr ed., 1994). But note that Minghi focuses on the literal borderlands
around the border dividing two or more states and on transactions across borders as relationships
become harmonious, id. at 90-92. 1 am concerned with states as borderlandsbetween larger systems and
the interactions that take place because of conflict or competition.
97. There is also the normative friction between mainstream international law and U.S.
imperium. However, this is the competition between two conceptions of world public order. It is a much
broader topic not confined to the issues of the Russian Near Abroad and a proper analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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The Borderlands of Eurasia: Normative Friction Along the Silk
Road

In writing about the "new world order," Peter Katzenstein has also given
an apt summary of modem Eurasian politics, writing that "[t]he end of the
cold war has moved world politics from centrally organized, rigidly bounded
environments that are hysterically concerned with impenetrable boundaries, to
ones in which territorial, ideological, and issue boundaries are attenuated,
unclear, and confusing." 98 In the arc of the Russian Near Abroad, we will
consider two groups of borderland states. 99 The first are the East European
states that were never part of the Soviet Union and now seek (or have
achieved) membership in the European Union. The second group of states is
in the region bounded by the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. These states had
been part of the USSR and now face the question as to whether they should be
part of the European public order or the Russian public order.
Normative friction occurs in states where public orders clash with each
other without definitive resolution. I will first set out three examples of
normative clashes in Eurasia as a sort of tour of the horizon.
1.

The East European States
a.

The GeopoliticalRegion

This region is primarily comprised of the former Warsaw Pact members
to Russia's west that had been independent states and not members of the
USSR. At one time (and perhaps again) considered the center of Europe, the
East European states of Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia
were the buffer states between the USSR and the NATO countries. In addition
to this, the Baltic Republics, which were annexed by the USSR in 1945, are
also typified as East European states under this analysis due to historic
similarities.
b.

The Normative Conflict: Europeanists, Atlanticists,
Revanchists

There are three struggles of varying intensity. One is the jostling
between the European Union and the domestic politics of East European states
over the changes that are needed for integration into the European Union.
While the countries of Eastern Europe are eager to enter the European Union,
they are not necessarily enthusiastic about the number of domestic normative
changes that are expected. In one study of how the OSCE, the Council of
Europe, and the European Union encouraged the governments of Latvia,
Estonia, Slovakia, and Romania to pass certain ethnic minority legislation in
the 1990s, Judith Kelley concluded that socialization-based methods were not
KATZENSTEIN, supra note 27, at 11.
99. A third group-the Central Asian republics comprised of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan-is beyond the scope of this Article. I will consider them in a future article
as they are the site of a new "Great Game" including not only Russian and Turkish influence, but
Islamist, Persian, American, and Chinese attempts to play a decisive role in shaping the region.
98.
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very effective when used on their own and that rational choice based concerns
such as barriers to membership in these institutions were more effective. 100 In
other words, this is an example of what Ikenberry and Kupchan would term
external inducement: where acts were changed first and (hopefully) a change
in beliefs follows.
Since 1996 the European Union has detailed country-specific policy
expectations for countries seeking accession. 101 Romania's recent entrance
into the European Union was marked by a deep division over Romanian laws
concerning adoptions and, in particular, how easy it was for foreigners to
adopt Romanian children. Romanians in part responded that these rules
stemmed from Romanian cultural practices which disfavored adoption. Yet
there were many orphans without families. Since Romanians themselves did
not generally adopt, they made it easier for foreigners to adopt these children.
At issue was whether there were adequate safeguards for the children
themselves.
While the European Union may have been motivated by the best of
concerns, the issue became a heated political topic in Romania. Romanians
viewed it as Brussels not understanding their own culture and their attempts to
solve a difficult problem. But, in the end, before gaining accession, Romania
put a moratorium on all foreign adoptions until the process could be more
fully reviewed.
While the accession process may have caused some muted normative
friction within Eastern Europe, it also sparked political arguments between the
European Union and Russia. Russia was used to a public order in which the
sovereignty concerns of the states on its borders were often ignored. However,
as certain of these states-particularly the Baltic states that actually bordered
Russia-entered into the EU accession process, the European Union took a
greater interest in how Russia conducted relations with these countries. After a
series of economic threats to the Baltic states (which are nothing new in the
Russian Near Abroad), then-EU Commissioner for External Affairs Hans van
den Broek said in 1998: "We've made it clear to Russia that we do not accept
their attempts to mix political and economic issues ....We resist unjustified
pressure on an E.U. candidate. ' 0 2 With this statement, the European Union
essentially set down a marker that the Baltics were no longer part of the
Russian regional public order, they had become part of the European Union's
public order.
Finally, there has been a dispute between the European Union and the
United States over the foreign policies of East European nations. The most
public iteration of these ongoing tensions was the support of Poland,
Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria (then awaiting accession) for the United
States's Iraq policy. This led to two famous quips: French President Jacques
Chirac's comment that these states had missed an opportunity to keep their
mouths shut (which greatly offended the East European states) and Donald

100. Judith Kelley, International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality
and Socialization by InternationalInstitutions, 58 INT'L ORG. 425, 426 (2004).
101. Id. at 429.

102. Kelley, supra note 100, at 434 (quoting Hans van den Brock, citation omitted).
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Rumsfeld's contrasting of10 the
"Old Europe" and the "New Europe" (which
3
offended the Old Europe).
This debate is between "Atlanticists"--who see a role for the United
States in European policy-and "Europeanists" who would prefer that the
European Union becomes an independent base of power. The United States,
transcending regions in building coalitions, may support the "construction of
Europe" but not to the extent that it is prevented from building ad hoc
alliances to pursue its goals.
2.

The Black SealCaspianRegion
a.

The GeopoliticalRegion

The Black Sea region is a blind spot of the western imagination-a
region where traditional concepts of Europe faded into the undefined region
that included Russia, Turkey, and Georgia.' 04 Not quite Europe, not quite
Asia. And this is all the more true when one includes in a broader definition of
the region, states traditionally associated with the Caspian Sea: Armenia and
Azerbaijan. 10 5 But the broader Black Sea region is a "decisive crossroads for
the future of the Wider Europe ....

[and it] is a civilisational crossroads, at the

confluence of Orthodox, Muslim and, increasingly so, Western political and
societal cultures." 10 6 This region is not only the meeting point of cultures, but
it was also the historic borderland of the Russian, Persian, and Ottoman
Empires. 107
Today the Black Sea/Caspian Sea region is the crossroads of the
European, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern security spaces. 108 Bulgaria and
Romania are members not only of the European Union, but NATO as well.
Turkey is a NATO member. Russia is its own center of power and Turkey,
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are all being pulled between one
or more centers of power. And, perhaps because this region is not fully
integrated into any of the definable security spaces (or normative realms), the
wider Black Sea region had0 9been largely ignored by experts on Europe,
Eurasia, and the Middle East.'
Moreover, the region is also a confluence of energy interests. During the
Soviet era the Caspian Sea and its oil resources were a "Russian lake" with a
small part on Iran's perimeter; now "[w]ith the emergence of the independent
and strongly nationalist Azerbaijan-reinforced by the influx of eager
Western oil investors-and the similarly independent Kazakstan [sic] and
103. Concerning President Chirac's remark, see Chirac Lashes out at 'New Europe,'
CNN.coM, Feb. 18, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/. Regarding
Secretary Rumsfeld's "Old Europe" comment, see Outrage at 'Old Europe' Remark, BBC NEWS.COM,
Jan. 23, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm.
104. See Ronald D. Asmus & Bruce P. Jackson, The Black Sea and the Frontiersof Freedom:
Towards a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy, POL'Y REv., June-July 2004, at 17, 18.
105. See id. at 20.
106. Fabrizio Tassinari, A Synergy for Black Sea Regional Cooperation:Guidelinesfor an EU
Initiative, CEPS POLICY BRIEF, June 4, 2006, at 1.
107. Asmus & Jackson, supra note 104, at 19.
108. Id. at 18.
109. Id.
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Turkmenistan, Russia
became only one of five claimants to the riches of the
110
Caspian Sea basin."'
b.

The Normative Conflict: Findingthe Borders of Europe

Except for its western section, this region has not been an historical part
of Europe. However, with changes in interests and perceptions, the Black
Sea/Caspian region may become so. As two policy analysts wrote: "Reaching
out to the Black Sea countries is the natural next step in completing our vision
of a Europe whole and free."11 ' This is the source of friction: The "gradual
geographic (and ideational) advancement of Euro-Atlantic community in' 112
the
region... is resisted by Russia's efforts to retain its traditional influence."
Even before September 11, the United States was interested in the region
as a source of energy and a path for oil and gas pipelines. Consequently, the
United States has had an interest in tyin the region to an Atlanticist security
regime and denying Russian hegemony. As then-NATO Secretary-General
(and future EU Commissioner for External Affairs) Javier Solana said,
"[w]hat we are expanding is a European, indeed Atlantic, civil space. I
deliberately include our military arrangements into this definition of 'civil
space.' The postwar experience in Western Europe suggests that
political and
' " 14
linked."
closely
are
integration
security
and
progress
economic
Since September 11, we can add the U.S. interest in forward basing in
the region for the Global War on Terror. Moreover, "[t]he traditional trade
routes of the Silk Road are now used to bring heroin to European markets and
dangerous technologies to al Qaeda terrorists." 115 As two analysts explained in
2000:
The Black Sea region is at the epicenter in the grand strategic challenge of trying to
project stability into a wider European space and beyond into the Greater Middle East...
. Instead of appearing as a point on the periphery of the European
landmass, it begins to
16
look like a core component of the West's strategic hinterland.1

Related, but not identical to U.S. interests, are those of the European
Union. The European Union's main tool is the European Neighborhood Policy
(ENP) and its Action Plans. The European Union's policy in the area has three
aspects: (a) enlargement into Romania, Bulgaria (which has occurred as of
2007), and possibly Turkey; (b) the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) for
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and (c) an EU-Russia

110. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2, at 93. See generally Kamyar Mehdiyoun, Ownership of Oil and
Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (2000) (arguing disputes over Caspian mining
rights have shifted from whether the seabed should be divided into how it should be divided); Faraz
Sanei, Note, The Caspian Sea Legal Regime, Pipeline Diplomacy, and the Prospectsfor Iran's Isolation
from the Oil and Gas Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran 's Legal Options with its Geopolitical Realities, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 681 (2001) (concerning the legal disposition of claims for Caspian resources).
111. Asmus & Jackson, supra note 104, at 23.
112. Tassinari, supra note 106, at 1.
113. See Blank, supra note 81, at 65.
114. Id. at 66 (quoting Javier Solana) (footnote omitted).
115. Asmus & Jackson, supra note 104, at 21.
116. Id. at 22.
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"strategic partnership."" ' 7 The ENP Action Plans have been used as a method
of the transfer of norms from the European Union to these borderland states.
The Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia plans all had
significant sections on Justice and Home Affairs. 118
In reaction to this widening of "European space" and, even worse, the
"Euro-Atlantic space," Gleb Pavlovsky, an advisor to Russian President Putin,
explained: "Russia is currently revising its policy in the post-Soviet space and
the mechanisms of its implementation." He stated that "any country [that
would] promote the doctrine of Russia's
rollback will certainly create a
11 9
country."
this
with
relations
in
conflict
The "color revolutions" of Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan from
2003-2005 were seen by Russia as being part of a process that included
expansion of the European Union and of NATO. 120 This may be why 2006
began with a crisis over energy exports from Russia to Ukraine and also trade
sanctions and increased energy prices by Russia against Georgia and Moldova
(which had also tilted westward in the previous years). 121 Moreover,
Azerbaijan is under combined
Russian and Iranian pressure "to restrict its
'1 22
dealings with the West."
The conflict over the public order governing the Caspian states is
particularly harsh, probably due to their status as oil producers competing with
Russia and Iran over Caspian Sea oil reserves. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Georgia have sought NATO's direct participation.1 23 Armenia, which is in a
conflict with Azerbaijan over the ethnic Armenian region of NagornoKarabakh within Azerbaijan, allied itself to Moscow. Azerbaijan, a Turkic
nation, sought closer ties to the United States and Turkey via NATO., 24 This
is also indicative of the role of Turkey as a possible future regional hegemon
for the Turkic states in the region. But it is a tough neighborhood. In 1993,
Turkey had implied it might intervene on the side of Azerbaijan in the war in
Nagorno-Karabakh; Russia responded by threatening a nuclear response.125
117. Tassinari, supra note 106, at 1-2.
118. See id. at 9; European Commission, EU/Azerbaijjan Action Plan (Nov. 14, 2006),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action-plans/azerbaijan-enp-apmfinal en.pdf; European
Commission, EU/Georgia Action Plan (Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
action.plans/georgia-enp-ap.final-en.pdf; European Commission, EU/Armenia Action Plan (Nov. 16,
2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action-plans/armenia-enp-ap-final-en.pdf, see
also European Commission, Communicationfrom the Commissioner to the Council and to the European
Parliament On the General Approach to Enable ENP PartnerCountries to Participatein Community
Agencies and Community Programmes (Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/
enp/pdf/com06_724_en.pdf (outlining both the strengths and weaknesses of the current program);
European Commission, European NeighbourhoodPolicy Strategy Paper (May 12, 2004), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy-paper-en.pdf (providing an overview of program
goals and methods).
119. Graeme P. Herd, Moldova & the Dniestr Region: Contested Past, Frozen Present,
Speculative Futures?, 14 CONFLICT STUD. REs. CENTRE, CENT.& E. EUR. SERIES 05/07 (Feb. 2005), at
14, availableat http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/cee/05%2807%29-GPH.pdf
120. See Tassinari, supra note 106, at 1.
121. Id.at 2.
122. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2, at 129; see also Blank, supra note 81, at 71 (describing U.S.
policy against the creation of an Iranian and Russian "sphere of influence").
123. Blank, supra note 81, at 66.
124. Id.at 73.
125. Id.
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B.

OverlappingInstitutions,Interests, Ethnicities,and Conflicts

The conflicts in Russia's Near Abroad show that modem maps may
obscure more than they enlighten. The world of normative friction is only
partially one of the borders on a map. It is also about the overlay of alliances,
of treaty systems, and of regional organizations. 126 Where these normative
systems overlap, there may be friction.
The U.S., EU, and Russian systems all overlap to varying degrees in the
Russian Near Abroad. Although these states had previously been within the
sphere of Soviet power, as Soviet strength waned that of the European Union
and the United States grew. The result was an overlay of European, American,
and (now) Russian public orders jostling for ascendancy in the same space.
The resulting friction has either fed--or at least hampered the resolution ofconflicts throughout the region: the Russian-backed separatist movements in
Georgia and Moldova, the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,
the destabilization of governments, and the pipeline politics.
Most of these conflicts can be seen broadly as the EU and U.S. systems
working together in opposition to attempts at re-imposing the Russian public
order upon these systemic borderlands. While the European Union seeks to act
like a regional hegemon for Eastern Europe and perhaps the Black
Sea/Caspian regions, a more accurate description may be that the western
strength there stems from the Euro-Atlantic partnership. Still without a
credible foreign policy or a military force, the European Union acts under the
security umbrella provided by the U.S.-led NATO. NATO's Partnership for
Peace program provided the sought-after security guarantees that stabilized
Eastern Europe and may someday do the same in the Black Sea/Caspian
region.
For all of its strength, the European Union is still a misshapen hegemon.
If the Soviet Union had been an economic dwarf with the gigantic arms of a
military superpower, the European Union is an economic giant with stunted
arms. As the European Union was unable to meet the tests of Bosnia or
Kosovo, American leadership through NATO solved these ostensibly
European problems. In this manner a world public order (U.S. imperium)
supports a regional public order (the European Union).
But within the common cause of the United States and the European
Union, there are some disagreements and differences. The European Union
seeks U.S. compliance with formal rules concerning the use of force, human
rights, and so on, embodied in the U.N. system. In this manner a regional
public order (the European Union) supports a global public order (the United
Nations).
These rivalries-this normative friction-are the result of multiple
conceptions of public order jostling in the same space. They are the result of
different conceptions of what constitutes order and what is needed for human
dignity. It is, at its base, the result of different people wanting to be part of
different communities and not believing in, or even attempting to seek a
126. "The Black Sea region is already a jungle of agreements, alliances, and acronyms.
Existing organizations often have overlapping activities, and their composition reveals a number of softspoken rivalries and competitions within the region." Tassinari, supra note 106, at 11.

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:331

universal optimum order. We are not at the end of history. But we may be able
to imagine the "Last Map":
Instead of borders, there would be moving "centers" of power, as in the Middle Ages...
. Replacing fixed and abrupt lines on a flat space would be a shifting pattern of buffer
entities, like the Kurdish and Azeri buffer entities between Turkey and Iran, the Turkic
Uighur buffer entity between Central Asia and Inner China (itself distinct from coastal
China) .... To this protean cartographic hologram one must add other factors, such as
migrations of populations, explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease. Henceforward the
map of the world will never be static. This future
map-in a sense, the "Last Map"-will
27
be an ever-mutating representation of chaos.'

The New Haven School is a modern reflection of the ideas and ideals of
the Western European Enlightenment. However, the Western European
Enlightenment itself is not fully accepted in some of these normative
borderlands. Is the policy-oriented jurisprudence that was devised during the
Cold War appropriate for the world of the "Last Map?"
VI. THE ROMANCE OF BLOOD AND SOIL: THE TURN FROM THE GLOBAL TO
THE LOCAL

In the wake of the Cold War, people around the world have remembered
the old romance of blood-ethnicity-and of soil-parochialism. Yet
ironically, although the Soviet Union is dissolved, the New Haven School, a
jurisprudence of U.S. cold warriors, has an outlook similar to that sought by
Lenin: individuals without an excessive attachment to a particular place or
people, who act as a vanguard for the universal good. But, as we know, any
conception of the universal is actually rooted to a particular history. It is time
for the New Haven School to take root, accept that it is merely one among
many conceptions of the good, and develop a new set of techniques for the
multipolar, multinormative world.
A.

Public OrderDiversity After the Cold War

Ironically, although the New Haven School had punctured the balloon of
international law's false normative universalism, it ended up defining a
process that had certain universalist assumptions. Although its scholars saw a
world actually divided among diverse public orders, as time passed policyoriented jurisprudence became focused on questions of bipolar superpower
conflict. Now that international politics is defined by the diversity of systems
the New Haven School originally described, the school's jurisprudence should
return to its original insights and refashion its techniques for what the world
has become.
The New Haven School needs to address how the idea of diverse views
of the good-and especially of particularism-will affect its methodology.
Political leaders involved in today's conflicts use the trappings of ethnicity,
locality, and history to motivate. This rhetoric affects public perceptions of
law and of rights. The Cold War was a battle of universalisms, two
cosmopolitan worldviews trying to convince the world that they each had the
127. ROBERT D. KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY 50-51 (2000).
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key to prosperity and justice. But today, there is relatively little enthusiasm for
any doctrine that claims to be universal. The dominant rhetoric concerns
respect for different cultures, for different traditions, and rejects
"assimilation" into an international norm. And, in their more virulent and
violent forms, these arguments become calls for cultural purity or ethnic
separation.
This is vastly different from the challenges faced by the founders of the
New Haven School. Lasswell and McDougal sought a method of finding and
fostering a law that would support "the global common interest." Today we
ask whether there is even a common perception of what that common interest
would be.
The value placed on protecting cultural difference-including different
conceptions of the right and the just-was not adequately addressed by the
New Haven School. As one scholar argued, "[a]ttenuated conceptions of
common interest" are sustained by and also sustain a world-view that favors
loyalty to state rather than to humanity as a whole. 128 But attenuated concepts
of common interest are the norm in most of the world.
This Article has considered how Europe, Russia, and the United
States-globally speaking, three relatively similar cultures-can nonetheless
have significant clashes over the nature of public order. Beyond the examples
from this Article, one can also consider the friction among cultures that have
even greater disparities. 29
There was, for example, the so-called "Asian values debate" that was
prevalent in the mid-to-late 1990s. But the roots of this debate can be traced
back to the time that Lasswell and McDougal were first formulating their
policy-oriented jurisprudence. Chung-Shu Lo of China said in the debate over
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the United Nations that "[t]he
basic ethical concept of Chinese social political relations is the fulfillment of
the duty to one's neighbour, rather than the claiming of rights."' 30 This
position is not singular to China; other Asian leaders have noted that the Asian
conception of human rights is different than what has evolved in Western
Europe. 131 One Chinese author recently described Asian values as
emphasizing "consensual solutions, communitarianism rather than
individualism, social order and harmony, respect for elders, discipline, a
paternalistic state, and the primary role of government in economic
development."' 32 While Asian cultures obviously believe in "human dignity"

128. CHEN, supra note 6, at 419.
129. Besides the examples discussed here, see also Josef L. Kunz, Editorial Comment,
Pluralism of Legal and Value Systems and InternationalLaw, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 370, 374-75 (1955)
(discussing the emergence of non-Western legal and value systems). Also, concerning challenges to
international law from a Third World perspective, see, for example, Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 31, 31 (2000) ("The regime of international law is illegitimate. It is a
predatory system that legitimizes, reproduces and sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third
World by the West.").
130.
131.

CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 69 (2003).
See TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 139 (stating that some Asian leaders object to the

application of Western, individualized human rights doctrine to Eastern, communitarian societies).
132.

TOMUSCHAT, supra note 130, at 70.
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the issue, of course, is how to operationalize133such a term across vastly
different social, economic, and political terrains.
Then there is the current focus on Islam. There is a "virtual
34
inseparability of Islam and the culture that is both its cause and its effect."',
Consequently, predominantly Islamic societies have shown hostility towards
the transplantation of norms that are considered foreign. 135 Some Muslim
nations have reserved the right not to be ruled by international
law, and have
36
declared that Shari'a will always have precedence.1
But let us set aside Islam, the varied religion with many different
conceptions and types of adherents, and focus instead on Islamism, the
fundamentalist public order that is challenging secular governments and
monarchies throughout the greater Middle East and South-East Asia. Is there a
"rhetorical unity" between Islamism and Western European secularism? With
Slavic Eurasianism? It is telling that the target of jihadists is not the infidel,
who is a member of the community who has gone astray, but the outsider,
who is not a member of the community at all. 137 Islamism and other
fundamentalisms, be they religious or political or ethnic, thrive on defining
the community and the outsider.
More generally, even in public orders that are not based on some sort of
fundamentalism, communities around the world are seeking to define
themselves based on their own cultures and not on a western perspective (with
universal pretensions) of what is just and of what is good. Muslim Middle
Easterners have not been moved by the rhetoric from the Bush Administration
concerning the march to freedom. If anything, according to some analysts they
"have a distinct vision of freedom: defined largely as the ability to reject the
guidance of the world's superpower. [The U.S.] desire to build liberal nationstates conflicts with a Middle Eastern desire to exercise sovereignty and selfdetermination independent of infidel outsiders."' 38 For some, human freedom
may be the ability to be different than what the United States wants them to
be.
While the New Haven School recognized in some of its early writings
the problem of universalist ideology competing with particularist ideologies,
this issue was not emphasized during the Cold War. Consequently, policyoriented jurisprudence has not adequately addressed what to do in a world
defined by competing parochialisms, as opposed to competing universalisms.
As political philosopher Gray Dorsey wrote in debate with McDougal in 1988,
133. See, e.g., Liu Huaqiu, Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Remarks at
the World Conference on Human Rights (June 15, 1993), quoted in Michael C. Davis, Human Rights in
Asia: China and the Bangkok Declaration,2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 215, 226-27 (1996) (stating, among other
things, "[t]he concept of human rights is a product of historical development. It is closely associated
with specific social, political and economic conditions and the specific history, culture, and values of a
particular country.").
134. ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J., CAN GOD & CAESAR COEXIST? BALANCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
& INTERNATIONAL LAW 181 (2004).
135. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 206-07 (1995).

136. DRINAN, supra note 134, at 182. Although Westerners may react critically to the decision
by Muslim nations that the Shari'a cannot be superseded by international law, the result is not very
different from the U.S. decision that, in internal matters, the Constitution trumps international law.
137. Ximena Ortiz, GeopoliticalJihad,NAT'L INT. 6, Spring 2006, at 5, 6.
138. Id. at 8.
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"[t]o the extent that McDougal and Lasswell proposed building a world public
order (society) that would not be culture-dependent, it must be concluded that
the proposal is not feasible."' 39 Dorsey argued that the various systems of
public order that exist have "different operative meanings of 'dignity' and of
'human individual."'' 1 40 As a child of the Enlightenment, the New Haven
School emphasizes rationality and commonality in pursuit of a universal set of
ends. But various regional public orders around the world-Russian and
Islamist particularly come to mind-reject part or all of the key features of the
Enlightenment project. The New Haven School has not fully addressed this.
The New Haven School needs to jettison the baggage of the Cold War
struggle between market democracy and totalitarianism and address the
complexity that animates the post-Cold War world. It should refocus itself not
on the goal of world public order but rather on the existence of diverse-and I
would say divergent-public orders.
B.

Reconsidering the New Haven School

If proponents of policy-oriented jurisprudence choose to reframe their
analysis of the diversity of public orders to suit a multipolar, multinormative
world, then I suggest four issues that, though beyond the scope of this Article,
they may want to consider.
1.

America 's Place in the World

First, one should consider how the role of the United States has changed
from the 1950s to today. The New Haven School was pitched as a tool that
American policy-makers could use in confronting the threat of
totalitarianism. 14 1 But many people in the world today perceive-rightly or
wrongly-the main threat of destabilization as coming from the United States.
In part, they are wary of U.S. attempts to make them conform to its rules and
mores. If the goal of policy-oriented jurisprudence had been, in part, to devise
a methodology that was meant to promote a vision of the good similar to that
found in liberal market democracies, then how can such a method be squared
with the fact that many people the world over resent attempts at such
persuasion? Due to its teleology, the New Haven School faced the twin
criticisms as being either "an old-fashioned naturalism in disguise or a smoke
screen for a defense of American foreign policy."' 42 It must find a way to be
neither.

139.

Gray L. Dorsey, The McDougal-Lasswell Proposal to Build a World Public Order, 82

AM. J. INT'L L. 41, 49 (1988).
140. Id. at 50.
141. Moreover, Lasswell's analysis had a distinctly anti-Soviet tone: "There are no reasonable
grounds for asserting that the core countries of the non-Soviet world are as devoid of the traditions and
operating institutions of human freedom as the core countries of the Soviet world." Lasswell,
Universality, supra note 1, at 6.
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The Nature of Public Orders

This leads to the second issue requiring reconsideration: the nature of
public orders. Taking diversity seriously may require decoupling the concepts
of minimum order from optimum order. Minimum order, as described here,
can be seen as being akin to non-intervention, but optimum order is a specific
conception of the good life itself. 143 Different cultures have different
conceptions of optimum order; however, they may each access the idea of
minimum order to tell others to stay out of their affairs.
What do Russian citizens and leadership, with their concerns that their
society is on the verge of chaos and threatened by various "others," consider
to be an acceptable minimum order or an optimum order? How would these
ideas have been defined by a man or woman on the street in Afghanistan? Or
in Georgia? In Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia? In Venezuela?
One of the problems of the New Haven School is that, while it pays lip
service to the existence of diverse systems of public order, it still defines
optimum order through the optic of U.S. values and norms. However, taking
seriously that there are diverse public orders means that there are multiple and
probably conflicting ideas as to what is an optimum order. And, if we describe
a minimum order as freedom from external coercion, then bridging the gap
from minimum order to a particular conception of optimum order becomes a
serious problem. This leads to the third issue requiring reconsideration.
3.

The Nature of Conflict

Although normative friction may be cast as a zero-sum game, it does not
have to be. Envisioning systemic conflict as a winner-take-all enterprise is
easy: A country is a member of the European Union or it is not. It joins
NATO or it does not. But, negotiated solutions may allow for greater
complexity. Perhaps a country joins the European Union but, to quell Russian
fears, it stays out of NATO.
Over the long run, though, it is unlikely that the citizenship and leaders
of a state would want their country to simply remain a borderland. While
systemic conflict does not have to be zero-sum, states will likely feel a pull (or
an internal desire) to integrate with one system or another so as to fully be a
member of a particular community. Moreover, Russia and Islamist factions so
far have treated systemic friction as a zero-sum game: either a state is with
them or it is against them.
Going forward, the New Haven School has to appreciate the value given
to local or cultural traditions, realize that people may fight to maintain their
own way of doing things, and accept that one person's rationality may not be
another's. Conflict may be the result, but it does not have to be.

143. See CHEN, supra note 6, at 415; see also Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard,
Policy-OrientedJurisprudenceand Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public
Orderof Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 316, 324 (1999) (discussing minimum order and optimum
order).
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Whose Public, Whose Order?
4.

The Nature of Cooperation

The fourth issue that I would highlight as warranting reconsideration by
the New Haven School is the nature of cooperation. Concerning the possibility
of global cooperation, McDougal wrote that one "can observe that there is in
fact ... a comprehensive earth-space community of the whole of humankind,
transcending all national boundaries, in the sense of interdetermination and
interdependence in the shaping and sharing of all values, even that of
survival."' 44 But this confuses interdependence with cooperation.
The Prisoner's Dilemma, for example, assumes interdependence (each
player's final result depends in part on the other player's choice), but not a
community (there is no communication, nor are there necessarily shared
values). Such a relationship can be formed whenever survival of two or more
actors is interlinked. Consider the famous trope of many action movies where
the hero and the villain end up with their guns pointed at each other's heads. If
one begins to pull the trigger, the other may have time to do so as well. This is
called a "security community"--as was the United States and the USSR
during the era of Mutually Assured Destruction-but I think Lasswell and
McDougal would both agree that this is not equivalent to the type of
normatively thick community that was implied by Lasswell in his description
of a "community of the whole of humankind" forged by interdependence. So,
which image is closer to reality-the world as village or the world as
competitors with their guns to each other's heads?
As Robert Kagan had suggested, perhaps we have both simultaneously.
Within a particular culture, within a normative realm, cooperation may be
"thick." However, absent special circumstances, cooperation across cultures
would be thinner. Put another way, what we seem to see is more cooperation
within normative realms and more competition between or across normative
realms.
One possibility to consider is that the key to fostering cooperation is not
in attempting to convince others that your conception of the law is more
rational than theirs but rather to use international law to facilitate small,
concrete plans for cooperation that may one day grow into larger endeavors.
The European Union began not as an enterprise to build a continent-spanning
proto-state, but rather as a coal and steel market. Perhaps the New Haven
School should set aside the plans of building a theoretical mechanism to
rationalize law into an optimum public order and instead focus on how people
with different, deeply-held beliefs can use the law to address issues of mutual
interest.
Building networks and fostering interaction across systemic borders will
not conjure up world peace. Nor will these activities make unjust orders just.
But they may reduce the friction along the margins. And that, at least, is a
start.

144. Myres S. McDougal, The Dorsey Comment: A Modest Retrogression, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
51, 52 (1988).
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VII. AFTERWORD

Although their comments to my Article are appreciated, I think that at
times Professors Reisman, Wiessner, and Willard misconstrue what I do-and
do not-argue. My Article points to the New Haven School's conception of
"diversity of systems of public order" and asks how it might apply to post9/11 geopolitics. I make no "plea" for diversity; 145 like Lasswell and
McDougal, I si Mply note that it exists. I have no "antipathy" towards
cosmopolitanism;' rather, I contend that we live in a time when the idea of
cosmopolitanism is rejected by numerous societies.
I do argue that this latter claim poses a problem for policy-oriented
jurisprudence because the New Haven School uses a methodology that
assumes a willingness of (most) interlocutors to enter into a discursive process
in seeking universal rights. While the New Haven School scholars may claim
"an undeniable process of communication" between cultures that is "one of
the central enterprises of law,"' 47 a perusal of the statements of scholars and
leaders from various states in the former Soviet Union (the focus of this
paper), Islamist groups, and others, show that such cross-cultural exchange is
not central but antitheticalto their conception of legal process. Or, at the very
least, they find so little as to be of common value with other cultures as to
make the result of such a process thin and wispy, rather than the robust
affirmation of a universal conception of the good claimed by Professor
Reisman and his colleagues.
Professor Reisman and his colleagues miss the point by brushing this off
with the comment that "[t]here always has been" normative friction between
cultures. 148 Of course there has, but in the Cold War most normative friction
was subsumed by the battle of two universalisms: liberal democracy and
Marxism-Leninism. I simply ask the resultant question: whether and how the
tools of the School may need to be adapted for the post-Cold War, post-9/1 1,
world of resurgent parochialisms.It is a question that Professor Reisman and
his co-authors chose not to engage in their critique.
They seem to be taken aback by my query but I ask it out of greatest
respect for the work of Lasswell, McDougal, and their colleagues. I also ask it
with the appreciation that among my contemporaries, very few scholars use
policy-oriented jurisprudence as described by Professor Reisman and his coauthors. To the contrary of being an attack on the New Haven School's
enterprise, my Article argues that policy-orientation jurisprudence as
originally conceived had important insights in international legal relations that
may be particularly useful todayj with proper adjustments.
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